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I.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

This appeal is brought pursuant to Article VIII, Sections 3
and 5 of the Constitution of Utah, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-22(3)(j) and 78-2a-3(k), and Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
II.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1.

Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the

Complaint was a nullity where plaintiff lacked capacity to sue
under Utah's wrongful death and survivorship statutes.
2.

Whether the trial court correctly denied the Rule 17(a)

Motion to substitute in plaintiff's place persons who had the
capacity to sue under Utah's wrongful death and survivorship
statutes.
3.

Whether the limitation period under Utah's wrongful

death statute is constitutional.
Concerning questions of law, the appeals court accords no
deference to the trial court's conclusions, and the standard of
review is "correctness."

City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788

P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990).
Concerning factual issues, if any, on summary judgment, the
record is viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving
party.

Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 414 (Utah

1986).
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III.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY

Constitutional Provisions:
Utah Const., Art. XVI, Sec. 5:
The right of action to recover damages for injuries
resulting in death, shall never be abrogated, and the
amount recoverable shall not be subject to any
statutory limitation, except in cases where
compensation for injuries resulting in death is
provided for by law.
Statutory Provisions:
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7:
Except as provided in Title 35, Chapter 1, when the
death of a person not a minor is caused by the wrongful
act or neglect of another, his heirs, or his personal
representatives for the benefit of his heirs, may
maintain an action for damages against the person
causing the death . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1)(a):
Causes of action arising out of personal injury to the
person or death caused by the wrongful act or
negligence of another do not abate upon the death of
the wrongdoer or the injured person. The injured
person or the personal representatives of heirs of the
person who died have a cause of action against the
wrongdoer or the personal representatives of the
wrongdoer for special and general damages . . . .
Rules:
Rule 12(b)(6), Utah R. Civ. P.:
The following defenses may at the option of the pleader
be made by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
Rule 15(c), Utah R. Civ. P.:
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in
the original pleading, the amendment relates back to
the date of the original pleadings.
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Rule 17(a), Utah R. Civ. P.:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest. An executor, administrator,
guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party
with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for
the benefit of another, or a party authorized by
statute may sue in that person's name without joining
the party for whose benefit the action is brought;
. . . No action shall be dismissed on the ground that
it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after
objection for ratification of commencement of the
action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real
party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or
substitution shall have the same effect as if the
action had been commenced in the name of the real party
in interest.
IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature Of The Case, Course Of Proceedings And
Disposition Below.

Mr. Haro's Estate sued defendants (who are beneficiaries of
the estate) for personal injury and wrongful death.

Defendants

moved to dismiss the claim under Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, on the grounds that Utah law does not permit
one's estate to bring an action for personal injury or wrongful
death.

The trial court granted the motion, ruling that the

Complaint was a nullity.

The trial court denied plaintiff's Rule

17(a) motion to substitute parties, which was filed after the
statute of limitations had run on the underlying claims.
B.

Statement Of Facts.
1.

On February 24, 1991, Martin Haro died as a result

of carbon monoxide poisoning he had sustained on December 17,
1990, while he was living at Mrs. Haro's Layton, Utah home.
at 1-2.)
-3-

(R.

2.

On January 12, 1993, Mr. Haro's Estate sued

decedent's wife, Maria Guadalupe Haro, and his son, Everardo
Haro, claiming that their fault caused his injuries and eventual
death.

The Estate sought special damages in excess of $80,000

(medical bills and funeral expenses).
3.

(R. at 1-2.)

The Estate also sought special and general damages

against Mr. Haro's wife and son for Mr. Haro's death.

(R. at 1-

2.)
4.

The trial court dismissed the Complaint for

failure to state a claim and denied the Estate's Motion to
Substitute under Rule 17(a), which was filed on or about April
28, 1993, after the two-year statute of limitations had run.

(R.

at 52, 53, 86, 163-65, 167-69, 172-75.)
5.

The trial court denied the Estate's Motion to

reconsider, with minor exceptions not before this Court.

(R. at

163-65, 167-69, 172-75.)
V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Where the Estate had no legal capacity to sue on its own
behalf or on behalf of others, it failed to state a claim and the
Complaint was a nullity.

The trial court properly denied

plaintiff's Rule 17(a) motion where the Estate had no legal
capacity to sue on behalf of the "real party in interest," and
where there was nothing to which such amendment would have
related back under Rule 15(c).

The legislature's imposition of a

reasonable time period in which to exercise the right to bring
wrongful death action is not inconsistent with the fundamental
-4-

nature of the right; the two-year statute of limitations is
constitutional.
VI.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE COMPLAINT WAS A NULLITY.
Mr. Haro's Estate lacked capacity to sue in its own behalf
or in behalf of another under Utah's wrongful death and
survivorship statutes.

Since the Estate lacked statutory

capacity to sue, it failed to state a claim for relief.
Therefore, the complaint was a nullity.
Wrongful death and survivorship claims in Utah are statutory
creations.

The statutes provide for a limited list of

individuals who are allowed to bring claims against alleged
wrongdoers.

Utah!s wrongful death statute, Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-11-7, provides that the heirs, or the personal
representatives of the deceased on behalf of the heirs, may bring
a wrongful death claim.

Utah's survivorship statute, Utah Code

Ann. § 78-11-12, similarly, provides that the heirs, or the
personal representatives of the heirs, may bring a survivorship
action against the alleged wrongdoer.

Neither statute provides

that the estate can bring an action against the alleged
wrongdoer.
The deceased's Estate is a separate entity from the heirs
and personal representatives.

Thus, the estate is not authorized

to bring a wrongful death or survivorship action and is not a
party under either the wrongful death or the survivorship
-5-

statute.

See Behm ! s Estate v. Gee, 117 Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657,

660 (1950). x
Claims exist in the persons statutorily specified.

The

claims do not exist in the Estate of the decedent, in behalf of
itself or of another.

The Complaint was therefore a nullity.2
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE MOTION TO
SUBSTITUTE: RULE 17(a) REQUIRES THAT THE PARTY WHO SUES
HAVE LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE IN ITS OWN BEHALF OR IN
BEHALF OF THE "REAL PARTY IN INTEREST"; WHERE THE
COMPLAINT WAS A NULLITY, THERE WAS NOTHING TO WHICH AN
AMENDMENT WOULD HAVE RELATED BACK UNDER RULE 15(c).
Plaintiff moved the trial court to allow it to substitute
the "real parties in interest" for the party bringing suit,
misconstruing Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 17(a) is inapposite.

a

The Court explained:

[S]uit can be instituted either by the heirs themselves
or by the personal representative of the deceased for
the benefit of the heirs. The wording of the section
compels a conclusion that the legislature intended that
the proceeds obtained from the wrongdoer would not be
intermingled with other assets of the estate of the
deceased . . . .
For many years this court has confirmed the principle
that the statutory beneficiaries take separate and
apart from the estate.
213 P.2d at 660.
2

Plaintiff asks what difference it makes if the Estate
rather than the party in whom a statutory claim exists brings
suit. If that were the attitude of the courts, what difference
would any statute or rule make?
-6-

A.

CONSTRUCTION OF RULE 17(a).

Rule 17(a) is not a "relation back" rule.
15(c) governs the "relation back" doctrine.

Instead, Rule

The purpose of Rule

17(a) is to grant defendant the right to have a claim prosecuted
by the real party in interest, preventing duplicate demands
against the defendant and permitting the defendant to assert all
defenses and counterclaims available against the real owner of
the claim.

Shaw v. Jeppson, 121 Utah 155, 239 P.2d 745 (1952).

Rule 17(a) assumes that the person who sues, but who is not
the "real party in interest," at least, has the capacity to sue
in behalf of the "real party in interest."3

When it is shown

that the person who brought suit is a stranger to the claim, Rule
17(a) does not assume that he may substitute the "real party in
interest" and trigger Rule 15(c)fs "relation back" provisions.
Under the statutory claims, Mr. Haro's Estate had no more
capacity to sue in behalf of the "real parties in interest" for
Mr. Haro's wrongful death or survivorship than did an unrelated
acquaintance of or a stranger to Mr. Haro.

The Estate's lawsuit

against defendants did not put defendants on notice of a claim
for wrongful death or survivorship by the heirs or personal
representative of decedent on behalf of the heirs.* Therefore,
3

Indeed, Rule 17 accommodates the wrongful death and
survivorship statutes by allowing the personal representatives to
maintain the action without naming the individual heirs, even
though the heirs are the "real parties in interest."
*This is particularly the case where the defendants both are
beneficiaries of the Estate of Mr. Haro, and had the potential to
benefit from their own misconduct, were the money to pass through
(continued...)
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the trial court properly denied the Rule 17(a) motion to
substitute, and determined that the Complaint was a nullity
subject to dismissal.
B.

APPLICATION OF RELATION BACK RULE, 15(c).

Rule 15(c) allows certain amendments in pleadings to relate
back to the date of original filing.

Rule 15(c) does not,

however, allow amendments substituting parties or adding new
parties.

Amendments substituting parties or adding new parties

amount to the assertion of a new claim and otherwise defeat the
purpose of statutes of limitation.

E.g., Doxey-Layton Co. v.

Clark, 548 P.2d 902 (Utah 1976); Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 761
P.2d 581 (Utah Ct. App. 1984).5
In the present case, had the trial court allowed the
substitution of parties, that amendment still would not have
related back to the original filing and saved the case from
dismissal.

4

( . ..continued)
the estate, which is precisely the result the legislature has
avoided under the clear statutory language.
5

The only exception to this rule is where the new and old
parties have an identify of interests. Doxey-Layton Co. v.
Clark, 548 P.2d 902 (Utah 1976); Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 761
P.2d 581 (Utah Ct. App. 1984).
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POINT III
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
Plaintiff contends that the statute of limitation in
wrongful death actions violates the Constitution of Utah.

The

provision on which the Estate relies is Article XVI, Section 5,
which states:
The right of action to recover damages for injuries
resulting in death, shall never be abrogated, and the
amount recoverable shall not be subject to any
statutory limitation, except in cases where
compensation for injuries resulting in death is
provided for by law.
The first prong concerns the right to bring a wrongful death
claim.

The second prong concerns the limitation of the amount of

damages recoverable in wrongful death actions.

The two parts

should be analyzed separately.
A.

STATUTES OF LIMITATION DO NOT ABROGATE THE RIGHT TO
RECOVER DAMAGES FOR INJURIES RESULTING IN DEATH.

Plaintiff argues that any statutory limitation in wrongful
death cases is unconstitutional.

Plaintiff relies on Berry v.

Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) and Malan v. Lewis, 693
P.2d 661 (Utah 1984) for this proposition.

This argument is

untenable and is not supported by either case.6

Indeed, Berry

and Malan support the conclusion that the legislature may enact
reasonable procedures for the enforcement of wrongful death
actions and may provide for reasonable defenses that are not
inconsistent with the fundamental nature of the wrongful death

e

If plaintiff's argument were accepted, there could never be
repose in wrongful death cases.
-9-

action itself, such as the imposition of reasonable limitation
periods in which to exercise the right.
Berry involved a wrongful death claim against an aircraft
manufacturer brought under products liability theories. The
death claim was instituted within the two-year period for
wrongful death claims. However, the statute of repose for death
or injury caused by a defective product was six years after sale
of the product or ten years after manufacture of the product.
The Court concluded that the statute of repose for defective
products was unconstitutional because it operated to bar actions
without regard to when the injury occurred.

In other words, the

statutory period in which to file suit for death or injury
arising out of the use of a product could run before the injury
or death occurred.

In that circumstance, the statute of repose

extinguished the right to bring an action before a claim arose,
operated as an absolute bar, provided the injured person no
reasonable time in which to sue, and therefore violated the open
courts and wrongful death provisions of the Constitution of Utah.
Berry, 717 P.2d 670, 671-85.7
The Berry Court recognized that despite the existence of the
open courts and wrongful death provisions, the Legislature may

T

In Malan, the Utah Supreme Court found Utah's Guest Statute
unconstitutional because it altogether deprived a class of
persons the right to bring suit for injuries or death. The
holding was grounded primarily in equal protection theory.
Unlike the statute before this Court which gave a statutory
plaintiff two years in which to sue, the guest statute provided
Mr. Malan no opportunity to bring a claim for injuries. 693 P.2d
at 663-69.
-10-

enact reasonable procedures for enforcement of wrongful
death actions and may provide for reasonable defenses
that are not inconsistent with the fundamental nature
of the wrongful death action.
Id. at 685.
Unlike the statute of repose struck down in Berry, the
statute of limitations for wrongful death does not run without
regard to the date on which the injury occurs.

The statute of

limitations begins to run only after the injury occurs. As
opposed to a statute of repose, as in Berry, the wrongful death
statute of limitations offers a balance of interests: it allows a
reasonable time in which to exercise the constitutional right,
yet protects a potential defendant from exposure for an unlimited
time as memories fade and evidence disappears; enacting the
wrongful death statute of limitation therefore falls within the
legislature's prerogative and is not inconsistent with the
fundamental nature of the wrongful death action itself.
Statutes which set reasonable time limitations in which to
exercise the right do not offend the rights at issue, are within
the legislature's prerogative, balance the defendant's rights and
interests, and are constitutional.

E.g., Horn v. Shaffer, 47

Utah 55, 151 P. 555 (1915); McHenry v. Utah Valley Hosp., 724 F.
Supp. 835 (D. Utah 1989).
B.

STATUTES OF LIMITATION DO NOT LIMIT AMOUNTS RECOVERABLE
FOR INJURIES RESULTING IN DEATH.

The limitation period at issue does not purport to place a
limit on amounts recoverable for injuries resulting in death.
Assuming a plaintiff files the claim within the reasonable time
-11-

set by the legislature (two years), the damages are not subject
to statutory limitation.
VII.

CONCLUSION

This Court should affirm the Amended Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment of Dismissal of the trial court,
DATED this

10

day of February, 1994.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

i'j /-J v

By

\*fa<MU$~v.

>rt H. Hei
By
Richard^TTT^^ar^Waljonei
Attorneys for Defendant/)
Appellee Maria Guadalupe Haro
35\rav\05968.885\bH ef
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RAYMOND M. BERRY (A0310)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
Maria Guadalupe Haro
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
THE ESTATE OF MARTIN HARO,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACTS,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
JUDGMENT

vs.
MARIA GUADALUPE HARO and
EVERARDO HARO,

Civil No. 930700016PI
Honorable w. Brent West

Defendants.

This action came on for hearing on Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute Real Party in
Interest on Thursday, the 3rd day of June, 1993, Honorable w.
Brent West presiding, no one appearing for the plaintiff, Raymond
M. Berry appearing for Defendant Maria Guadalupe Haro and J. Kent
Holland appearing for Defendant Everardo Haro.

The Court having

read the memoranda of counsel, having heard the arguments of
Raymond M. Berry and J. Kent Holland and also having considered
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration as to Rule 59(1) and
60(b)(1) Motions as timely made, now therefore makes the
following amended findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On February 24, 1991, Martin Haro died from carbon

monoxide intoxication as the result of inhaling carbon monoxide
fumes on December 17, 1990, in the home of his wife, Maria
Guadalupe Haro.
2.

That on January 12, 1993, an action was instituted

in the name of the Estate of Martin Haro, Plaintiff, vs. Maria
Guadalupe Haro and Juan A. Haro.
3.

That on February 26, 1993, an Amended Complaint

was filed which listed only Maria Guadalupe Haro and Everardo
Haro as defendants.
4.

That the Complaint and Amended Complaint are

nullities since the Estate of Martin Haro does not have capacity
to sue.
5.

That the Amended Complaint naming Everardo Haro as

a defendant was filed more than two years after the date of the
death of Martin Haro.
6.

That Estella Haro, Maria A. Treto, Leonor Arteago,

Alberto Haro, Juan A. Haro, Francisca Arellano, Esteban Haro,
Raudel Haro, Emilia Haro and Sylvia Haro are children and heirs
of Maria Guadalupe Haro and Martin Haro.
7.

Martin Haro died intestate.

2

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

As the Estate of Martin Haro is not an heir and

did not have the capacity to sue, the Complaint and Amended
Complaint are nullities.
2.

It is not necessary to make a determination of

heirship under the Probate Code in order to maintain a wrongful
death action.
3.

Oral argument was not necessary.
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL

Now therefore, it is ordered and adjudged:
1.

That the above-entitled action by the Estate of

Martin Haro v. Maria Guadalupe Haro and Everardo Haro be
dismissed with prejudice on the merits.
2.

That Plaintiff's Motion to substitute the

children, Estella Haro, Maria A. Treto, Leonor Arteago, Alberto
Haro, Juan A. Haro, Francisca Arellano, Esteban Haro, Raudel
Haro, Emilia Haro and Sylvia Haro is denied with prejudice.
3.

That the action of the Estate of Martin Haro v.

Maria Guadalupe Haro and Everardo Haro is dismissed with
prejudice as to Defendant Everardo Haro as the action was not
instituted within two years of the date of the death of the
deceased, Martin Haro.

-3

DATED this

day of August, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable w. Brent West
District Court Judge
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

Linda St. John, being duly sworn, says that she is
employed by the law offices of snow, Christensen & Martineau,
attorneys for Defendant Maria Guadalupe Haro herein; that she

served the attached AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND JUDGMENT (Case Number 930700016PI, Second Judicial District
Court of Davis County, State of Utah) upon the parties listed
below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope
addressed to:
J. Kent Holland
ANDERSON & HOLLAND
Attorney for Everardo Haro
623 East 100 South
P.O. BOX 11643
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0643

Donald C. Hughes
Attorneys for Plaintiff
795 - 24th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Scott W. Holt
44 North Main
Layton, Utah 84041

and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
on the

y ' day of August, 1993,

SUBSCRIBED

day of

August, 1993.
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in the state of Utah
Mv Commission Expires:
.M_0T/t BY PUBLIC

iStt

IfrOmittKionExpirts
JTAlBOFtfTAW
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that on the

M

day of February, 1994

I caused two (2) true and correct copies of the Brief of
Defendant Maria Guadalupe Haro to be served upon the following:
Donald C. Hughes
Attorneys for Plaintiff
795 - 24th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Scott w. Holt
44 North Main
Layton, Utah 84041
J. Kent Holland
ANDERSON & HOLLAND
Attorney for Everardo Haro
623 East 100 South
P.O. Box 11643
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0643
Richard

